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Market risk premia vary over time and their fluctuations are a major cause of asset price
volatility. But what drives changes in risk premia?  The standard rational expectations answer relates
changes in risk premia to changes in information about exogenous fundamentals which correctly alter
the market’s assessment of future risky events, the most important of which are business cycles. Such a
view implies that excess returns are predictable by changes in observed fundamentals which, in turn,
explain market volatility. Although there is some empirical support for this view, it cannot be the full
explanation. Asset prices are not explained well by fundamental factors and, as Paul Samuelson used to
quip, the market has forecasted nine of the last five recessions.
An alternative perspective holds that, in addition to exogenous fundamental conditions, the bulk
of asset returns’ volatility is caused by fluctuations in market belief. We hold the view that agents do
not know the true dynamics of the economy since it is a non-stationary system with time varying
structure that changes faster than can be learned with precision from data. With diverse beliefs, a large
proportion of price volatility is then endogenously generated. This component is called Endogenous
Uncertainty. Some papers which reflect these ideas includes Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985),
(1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Kurz (1974), (1994), (1997), (2008),
(2007) Kurz and Beltratti (1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001), Kurz and Schneider (1996), Kurz Jin and
Motolese (2005a) (2005b), Kurz and Wu (1996), Motolese (2001), (2003), Nakata (2007), Nielsen
(1996), (2003) and Wu and Guo (2003), (2004). In particular, Kurz and Motolese (2001) and Kurz Jin
2and Motolese (2005a) demonstrate that Endogenous Uncertainty explains the equity premium and
stochastic volatility. However, these papers study risk premia via simulations of equilibria. They do not
study the determinants of risk premia either analytically or empirically. 
In this paper we study the effect of market belief on the structure of risk premia. Beliefs are
diverse but individually rational in a sense to be defined. Our problem is to establish the relation
between market belief and market risk premia. We derive analytic results which are then tested
empirically by using data on the market distribution of beliefs. Observations on market belief are
extracted from data on monthly forecasts of future interest rates and macro economic variables
compiled by the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BLUF) since 1983. A market state of belief is a
distribution of individual beliefs and in the theoretical and empirical analysis we focus on the first two
moments. Since an agent’s perceived risk premium is the conditional expectation of excess returns of an
asset, an economy where agents hold diverse beliefs has many subjectively perceived risk premia.
The literature on excess returns and risk premia is large. We mention a few papers which report
on convincing evidence gathered in recent years against the expectations hypothesis (e.g. Fama and
Bliss (1987), Stambaugh (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and
Piazzesi and Swanson (2004)). They show that investments in Treasury securities generate predictable
excess returns. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) exhibit predictable excess holding returns in bond markets
while Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) find excess returns in two futures markets: Fed Funds futures in
1988:10 - 2003:12 and Eurodollar futures in 1985:Q2-2003:Q4. “Predictability” is used here in the
sense of exhibiting long term statistical correlation between current information and future excess
returns. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) do not estimate structural
models to explain the source of excess returns but deduce such returns from estimated reduced form
models for forecasting returns. Broadly speaking, they argue that bond excess returns are associated
with business cycles and for this reason they use pro-cyclical variables such as current yields or year
over year growth rate of Non Farm Payroll (in short NFP) to predict excess returns. We comment later
on results in the empirical finance literature which are compatible with our approach such as Miller
(1977), Diether et al (2002), Park (2005) and Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
Our results confirm earlier results about the effect of cyclical variables on risk premia. However,
using our perspective we show that risk premia contain a large component generated by the dynamics
3of market belief. This component is independent of the observed fundamental variables used in the
above studies where the term “independent” highlights the fact that pure belief is a variable measured
net of all observed fundamentals, and it has its own dynamic law of motion. The market belief is a state
variable reflecting investor’s perceived future returns, net of fundamental information. This state
variable functions like any exogenous fundamental variable may be considered to be an externality taken
as given by all. In equilibrium, fluctuations in market belief cause large changes in the risk perception of
market participants. Here we study the risk premia on holdings of long positions in Federal Funds
Futures, 3-month and 6-month Treasury Bills. The annualized mean risk premium on holding such
assets for 1-12 months is about 40-60 basis points and we find that, on average, the component of
market belief in the risk premium at a random date exceeds 50% of the mean. Since the time variability
of market belief is large, this component is frequently larger than 50% of the mean premium. We find
that this component is larger the shorter is the holding period of an asset.
We focus on two sets of results. First we show analytically and empirically that much of the
time variability of market risk premium is generated endogenously by the dynamics of beliefs. Second,
we show that the effect of market belief on the risk premium takes a specific form. When the market
holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset, the long position is taken to be less
risky and hence the risk premium on a long position of that asset falls. More generally, market optimism
about future economic conditions lowers the risk premium while pessimism about future economic
conditions increases the risk premium. This inverse relationship suggests that it may be useful to think
of “bull” markets in an asset class to constitute periods of lower risk premia on long positions while
“bear” markets constitute periods of high risk premia. Note that in a rational expectations based asset
pricing theory the concepts of “bull” or “bear” markets are not well defined. We test our conclusion
empirically in all three markets and find the data supports the theoretical findings.
1.  Asset Pricing Under Heterogenous Beliefs  
1.1 An Illustrative Decision Model
Consider an asset or a portfolio of assets whose market price is , paying an exogenous riskypt
sequence { } under a true and unknown probability  which is non-stationary due toDt , t'1 ,2 ,... Πˆ
structural changes over time. Let  be the riskless interest rate,  and hence excess return overrt Rt'1% rt
4 We always have finite data and cannot estimate with certainty the measure on sequences. However, if this measure
has a simple representation such as a Markov transition function, then with adequate data it can be approximated so closely as
to make the assumption in the text entirely reasonable. Estimation of  with an epsilon error only increases belief divergencemˆ
as it reduces the scope of what is common knowledge and complicates the theory without adding much empirical substance. 
5 It would be more realistic to assume the values Dt  grow and the growth rate of the values has a mean µ rather than
the values themselves. This added realism is useful when we motivate the empirical model later but is not essential for the
analytic development.
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the riskless rate is . The risk premium over the riskless rate is the conditional(1/pt)(pt%1%Dt%1&Rtpt)
expectations of excess returns. Since it is a function of equilibrium prices, a risk premium - as a function
of state variables - is best deduced from equilibrium prices. With this in mind, the model below is used
to deduce a closed form solution of the asset price map so as to enable a study of the factors
determining the risk premium. To obtain closed form solutions we use a model which is very common
in the literature on Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium (e.g. Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy
and McNichols (1989), Wang (1994), He and Wang (1995), Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and others
cited in Brunnermeier (2001)). Nevertheless, our key results are fully general and do not depend upon
the specific model used. We now address a key issue. Our agents do not know the true probability Πˆ
and hold diverse probability beliefs about it. The fact that there are many subjective risk premia in the
market raises two questions that will be at the basis of our development in the next two sections. First,
why do agents not know the probability ? Second, what is the common knowledge basis of all agents
Πˆ
in an economy with diverse beliefs? 
Starting with the second question, our answer is past data on observables. The economy has a
set of observable variables and  is one of them. Agents have a long history of the variables, allowingDt
rich statistical analysis which leads all of them to compute the same empirical moments and the same
finite dimensional distributions of the observed variables. Using standard extension of measures they
deduce from the data a unique empirical probability measure on infinite sequences denoted by . It canmˆ
be shown that   is stationary (see Kurz (1994)) and we call it “the stationary measure.” This is themˆ
empirical knowledge shared by all agents4. We assume the data reveals that under    mˆ Dt , t'1,2,...
constitutes a Markov process where is conditionally normally distributed with means Dt%1 µ%λd(Dt&µ)
and variance 5.  is the unconditional mean of  . The unique probability  is then known to all.
σ
2
d µ Dt mˆ
To simplify define , hence the process { } is zero mean with unknown truedt ' Dt & µ dt , t'1 ,2 ,...
probability Π and an empirical probability m. Why is m not equal to Π? With this issue in mind we turn
5to the first question. 
Our economy has undergone changes in technology and social organization. These are rapid
with major economic effects, making { } a non-stationary process. Although this meansdt , t'1 ,2 ,...
that the distributions of the ‘s are time dependent, it is more than viewing { } as adt dt , t'1 ,2 ,...
sequence of productivity “regimes.” It also means that, although we measure the  in a single unit ofdt
account, over time the nature of assets and commodities change. Such variability makes it impossible to
learn the unknown Π. The probability  m  is merely an average over an infinite sequence of regimes,
reflecting only long term frequencies. Belief diversity starts with the fact that agents disagree over the
meaning of public information. They believe  Π  is different from m and construct models to express the
implications they see in the data. Being common knowledge, the empirical probability  m is a reference
for any concept of rationality. An agent’s model may be viewed as “extreme” but it cannot be declared
“irrational” unless proved to contradict the empirical evidence. Thus, belief rationality requires a
subjective model not to contradict the empirical evidence  m. 
Turning now to our infinite horizon model, at date t  agent i buys  shares of stock and
θ
i
t
receives the payment  for each of  held. We assume the riskless rate is constant over time sodt%µ θ
i
t&1
that there is a technology by which an agent can invest the amount at date t and receive withB it
certainty the amount  at date t+1. The definition of consumption is then standardB it R
.c it ' θ
i
t&1 [pt % dt % µ] % B
i
t&1 R & θ
i
t pt & B
i
t
Equivalently, define wealth  and derive the familiar transition of wealthW it 'c
i
t %θ
i
tpt%B
i
t
(1a)     .W it%1' (W
i
t &c
i
t )R%θ
i
tQt%1 , Qt%1'pt%1% (dt%1%µ )&Rpt
 are excess returns. Given some initial values  the agent maximizes the expected utility Qt (θ
i
0 , W
i
0 )
(1b)    U ' E it
(θi , c i)
[
j
4
s ' 0
&β
t%s&1e
&( 1
τ
c it%s)
| Ht]
subject to a vector of state variables  and their transitions, all specified later.   consists of all pastψit Ht
observable variables. We recognize the limitations of the exponential utility and use it as a good vehicle
to explain the main ideas, hence the term “illustrative” in the title of this Section. After deducing the
closed form solution of equilibrium risk premium we show how to generalize the key results.  
We now state an assumption and a conjecture. First, we assume the agent believes the payoff
{ } is conditionally normally distributed. Second, we conjecture that given the economy’sdt , t'1 ,2 ,...
6state variables, equilibrium price  is also conditionally normal. In the next section we describe thept
state variables and the structure of belief and Theorem 2 confirms the conjecture. In the Appendix we
show that for an optimum of (1a)-(1b), there is a constant vector  u so the stock demand function is
(2) .θit(pt) '
Rτ
r σˆ2Q
[ E it ( Qt%1) % uψ
i
t]
 is an adjusted conditional variance (see the Appendix for details) of excess stock returns which isσˆ2Q
assumed constant and the same for all agents. The term  is the intertemporal hedging demand whichuψit
is linear in agent i’s state variables. We have earlier assumed the dynamics of payoffs deduced from the
empirical frequencies is characterized by a first order Markov process with transition
(3)  .dt%1 ' λd dt % ρ
d
t%1 , ρ
d
t%1 - N(0 , σ
2
d )
Since the implied stationary probability is denoted by  m, we write .E m[dt%1 |dt] ' λd dt
Is the stationary model (3) the true data generating process?  Those who believe the economy is
stationary accept (3) as the truth. Such belief is rational since there is no empirical evidence against it.
However, since { } is non-stationary with unknown probability  Π, most agents do notdt, t'1,2,...
believe (3) is adequate to forecast the future. All surveys of forecasters show that subjective judgment
about the data contributes more than 50% to the final forecast (e.g. Batchelor and Dua (1991)). Hence,
agents form their own beliefs about dt+1 and other state variables explored later. With possibly complex
beliefs, how do we describe an equilibrium? For such a description do we really need to give a full,
detailed, development of the diverse theories of all agents? The structure of belief is our next topic.
1.2 Modeling Heterogeneity of belief  I: Individual Belief as a State Variable
The theory of Rational Beliefs due to Kurz (1994), (1997) defines an agent to be rational if his
model cannot be falsified by the data and if simulated, its simulated data reproduce the stationary
probability m deduced from the actual data. The objective of this paper is the empirical test of Theorem
3 stated below and for that we use only the most basic restrictions of the theory of Rational Beliefs.
Before explaining them we note that one of the theory’s aims is to account for the evidence of
persistent belief diversity. But this diversity raises a methodological question. In formulating an asset
pricing theory should we describe in detail the subjective models of each of the agents in the economy? 
With wide diversity this is a formidable task. Also, if the objective is to study dynamics of asset prices,
is such a detailed description necessary? An examination of the subject reveals that, although an
7intriguing question, such a detailed task is not needed. Instead, to describe an equilibrium all we need is
to specify how the beliefs of agents affect their subjectively perceived transition functions of state
variables. Once specified, the Euler equations are fully defined and market clearing leads to equilibrium
pricing. We now explain this observation. 
In markets with heterogenous beliefs agents are willing to reveal their forecasts. Samples of
individual forecasts are thus taken and their distributions become publicly available. We then make the
realistic assumption that forecast distributions are public observations over time. This fact points to the
crucial difference between markets with and without private information. A market with asymmetric
private information is secretive: agents do not reveal their forecasts since these provide real information
about unobserved state variables. Such revelation eliminates the small advantage that each agent has
relative to others. When an individual’s forecasts of a state variable are revealed in our market - without
private information - others do not view such forecasts as new information. They view them as an
expression of his opinion and consequently do not update their own beliefs about that state variable.
Here a forecaster uses the forecasts of state variables by other agents only to alter his forecasts of
future endogenous variables since we shall show that these depend upon future market belief. But then,
how do we describe the individual and market beliefs?
The key analytical step (see Nielsen (1996), Kurz (1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001), Kurz, Jin
and Motolese (2005a),(2005b)) is to treat individual beliefs as state variables, generated by the agents
within the economy. Here we use the approach of Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a), (2005b) as adapted
and applied to the problem of this paper. We outline it now. 
An individual belief about an economy’s state variable is described with a personal state of
belief which uniquely pins down the transition function of the agent’s belief about next period’s
economy’s state variable. This implies that personal state variables and the economy-wide state
variables are not the same. A personal state of belief is like any other state variables in the agent’s
decision problem but is analogous to the concept of a “type” of an agent. A given personal state of
belief at t identifies the agent type at date t. However, at t he is not certain of his future belief types
which are determined by a transition of his personal state of belief. The distribution of individual states
of belief, which is defined as “the market state of belief,” is then an economy-wide observable state
variable whose moments play an important role. All moments could matter in equilibrium, but due to
the exponential utility which we use, equilibrium endogenous variables depend only on the mean market
8states of belief. This will be generalized in the empirical work reported later. As noted, the crucial fact
is that the market state of belief is observable. In equilibrium, endogenous variables (e.g. prices) are
functions of the economy’s state variables, including market state of belief. But in a large economy an
agent’s “anonymity” implies that a personal belief state has a negligible effect on prices and past
personal states are not observed. Finally, due to the effect of market belief on endogenous variables, an
agent uses the equilibrium map to forecast all endogenous variables but must forecast future market
states of belief. To forecast future endogenous variables an agent must, therefore, forecast the beliefs
of others. It follows that the main issue we need to discuss next is the dynamics of individual beliefs. 
A simple implication of the rationality principle of Rational Belief says that an individual belief
cannot be described by a constant transition unless an agent believes the stationary transition (3) is the
truth. To explain suppose agents hold diverse beliefs which are different from (3). If one holds a
constant transition as his belief but not (3) then over time his average belief is different from (3). Since
(3) is the time average in the data, this proves he is irrational. Hence, if different from (3) an agent
cannot hold a constant belief. But being wrong is not the issue. Rational agents hold wrong beliefs most
of the time when there is no empirical proof they are wrong. This is so since when agents use diverse
probability models when there is only one true law of motion then most are wrong most of the time and
the average market forecasting model is often wrong. The term “wrong” is understood to be relative to
a standard which is not knowable. Such market mistakes are at the heart of endogenous uncertainty.
 We now introduce agent i’s state of belief  . It describes his perception by pinning down hisg it
transition functions. Adding to “anonymity” we assume agent R  knows his own  and the marketg Rt
distribution of  at  t across i. In addition he observes past distributions of the  for all τ < t henceg it g
i
τ
he knows past values of all moments of the distributions of . We specify the dynamics of  by   g i
τ
g it
(4) g it%1 ' λZ g
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1 , ρ
ig
t%1 - N( 0 , σ
2
g )
where   are correlated across  i  reflecting correlation of beliefs across individuals. The concept ofρigt%1
an individual state of belief is central to our development and we consider (4) to be a primitive. It is
simply a positive description of type heterogeneity which can be justified in many ways. One compelling
reason for it is that it is supported by the data as shown later. Analytic justifications can also be
developed. For example, Kurz (2008) deduces (4) as a limit posterior of a Bayesian inference.
How is  used by agent i? If denotes agent i’s perception of t+1 payoff then pins downg it d
i
t%1 g
i
t
his expectation  of the difference between his date t forecast of all state variables and theE it [d
i
t%1&λddt]
9forecasts under the empirical distribution  m. Hence, agent i’s date t perceived distribution of isdt%1
(5)   .d it%1 ' λd dt % λ
g
dg
i
t % ρ
id
t%1 , ρ
id
t%1 - N(0 , σˆ
2
d )
The assumption that  is the same for all agents is made for simplicity. It follows that  measuresσˆ2d g
i
t
(6) .E i [d it%1 |Ht ,g
i
t ] & E
m [dt%1 |Ht ]' λ
g
dg
i
t
Restricting  to have a zero unconditional mean follows from the Rational Belief principle: deviationsg it
of i’s belief from the empirical frequencies are averaged out to zero. Also, (6) shows how to measure
 in practice. For a state variable Xt,  data on i’s forecasts of  Xt+1  (in (5) it is  ) are measured byg
i
t dt%1
. One then uses standard econometric techniques to construct the stationary forecastE i [X it%1 |Ht ,g
i
t ]
with which to compute the difference in (6). This construction and the data it generatesE m [Xt%1 |Ht ]
are also used by Fan (2006). An agent who believes the empirical distribution is the truth is described
by . He believes . Since an agent’s belief is about our structurally changingg it ' 0 dt%1-N(λd dt ,σ
2
d)
society, the  reflect belief about different economies over time. For example, in 1900 the  wereg it g
i
t
related to electricity and combustion engines, while in 2000 the  reflected beliefs about informationg it
technology. Hence, success or failure of past   tell you little about what present day  should be.g i
τ
g it
1.3 Modeling Heterogeneity of belief II: Individual and Market Beliefs
Averaging (4) denote by  the mean of the cross sectional distribution of  and we refer to itZt g
i
t
as “the average state of belief.” It is observable.  Due to correlation across agents, the law of large
numbers is not operative and the average of   over i does not vanish. We write it in the form  ρigt
(4b) .Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρ
Z
t%1
The true distribution of   is unknown. Correlation across agents exhibits non stationarity and thisρZt%1
property is inherited by the { Zt , t = 1, 2, ...} process. Since Zt are observable, market participants have
data on the joint process { } hence they know the joint empirical distribution of(dt , Zt) , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
these variables. For simplicity we assume that this distribution is described by the system of equations
    
(7a) dt%1 ' λd dt % ρ
d
t%1
(7b) Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρ
Z
t%1
ρ
d
t%1
ρ
Z
t%1
- N
0
0
,
σ
2
d, 0,
0, σ2Z
' Σ˜ , i.i.d.
Now, an agent who does not believe that (7a)-(7b) is the truth, formulates his own model\belief. We
have seen in (5) how agent  i’s belief state  pins down his forecast of  . We now broaden thisg it d
i
t%1
idea to an agent’s perception model of the two state variables . Keeping in mind that before(d it%1 , Z
i
t%1 )
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observing  agent i knows , his belief takes the general form(dt%1,Zt%1 ) dt and Zt
(8a) d it%1 ' λd dt % λ
g
d g
i
t % ρ
id
t%1
(8b)  Z it%1 ' λZ Zt % λ
g
Zg
i
t % ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
id
t%1
ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
ig
t%1
- N
0
0
0
,
σˆ
2
d , σˆZd , 0
σˆZd , σˆ
2
Z , 0
0 , 0 , σ2g
, ' Σi
(8c) g it%1 ' λZ g
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1
(8a)-(8b) show that, as required,  pins down the transition of both state variables . Thisg it (d
i
t%1 ,Z
i
t%1 )
simplicity ensures that one state variable pins down agent i’s subjective belief of how conditions at date
t are different from normal as reflected by the empirical distribution:
   E it
dt%1
Zt%1
& E mt
dt%1
Zt%1
'
λ
g
d g
i
t
λ
g
Z g
i
t
.
The average market expectation operator is defined by .  From (8c) it isE¯t (C ) '
m
E it ( C ) di
   .    E¯t
dt%1
Zt%1
& E mt
dt%1
Zt%1
'
λ
g
d Zt
λ
g
Z Zt
Higher Order Beliefs. One must distinguish between higher order belief which are temporal and those
which are contemporaneous. Within our theory the system (8a)-(8c) defines agent i’s probability over 
sequences of and as is the case for any probability measure, it implies temporal higher order(dt , Zt , g
i
t )
beliefs of agent i with regard to future events. For example, we deduce from (8a)-(8c) statement like
.E it (dt%N)'EtE
i
t%1 . . .E
i
t%N&1(dt%N) , E
i
t (Z
i
t%N)'Et E
i
t%1 . . .E
i
t%N&1( Z
i
t%N)
It is thus clear that temporal higher order beliefs are properties of conditional expectations. In addition,
by (8c) (or equivalently (4)) we have  . Hence we can also deduceE¯t (dt%N%1)'λdE¯t(dt%N)%λ
g
dE¯t (Zt%N)
perceived higher order market beliefs by averaging individual beliefs. For example, we have that
.E¯t (Zt%N) ' E¯t E¯t%N&1 (dt%N) & E¯tE
m
t%N&1 (dt%N)
The perception models (8a)-(8c) show that properties of conditional probabilities do not apply
to the market belief operator  since it is not a proper conditional expectation. To see why letE¯t(C )
 be a space where take values and Gi  be the space of . Since  i  conditions on , hisX'D×Z (dt , Zt) g
i
t g
i
t
unconditional probability is a measure on the space where öi is a sigma field. The(( D×Z×G i)4 ,öi)
market conditional belief operator is an average over conditional probabilities, each conditioned on a
different state variable. Hence, this averaging does not permit one to write a probability space for the
market belief. The market belief is neither a probability nor rational and we have the following result:
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Theorem 1: The market belief operator violates iterated expectations: .E¯t (dt%2 ) … E¯t E¯t%1( dt%2 )
Proof:  Since     it follows that E it (dt%2 ) ' λdE
i
t ( dt%1 ) % λ
g
d E
i
t (g
i
t%1) ' λd [λd dt%λ
g
d g
i
t ] % λ
g
dλZg
i
t
(9) .E¯t (dt%2 ) ' λ
2
d dt%λ
g
d (λd % λZ) Zt
On the other hand we have from (8a) that   hence we have that  E¯t%1 ( dt%2 ) ' λd dt%1 % λ
g
d Zt%1
.E it E¯t%1 ( dt%2 ) ' λd [λd dt % λ
g
d g
i
t ] % λ
g
d [λZ Zt % λ
g
Zg
i
t ]
Aggregating now we conclude that
(10) .E¯t E¯t%1 (dt%2) ' λ
2
d dt % λ
g
d (λd % λZ % λ
g
Z ) Zt
Comparison of (9) and (10) shows that .  E¯t (dt%2 ) … E¯tE¯t%1 ( dt%2 )
Belief and Information: Understanding . For each agent,  is a state variable like any other.Zt Zt
News about  are used to forecast prices and assess market risk in the same way macroeconomic dataZt
such as GNP growth or NFP are used to assess the risk of a recession. Market belief may be wrong as
it forecasts more recessions than are realized. Risk premia may rise or fall just because agents are more
optimistic or pessimistic about the future, not necessarily because there is any specific data to convince
investors the future is bright or bleak. But then, how do agents update their beliefs when they observe
? In sharp contrast with models of private information, agents do not revise their own beliefs aboutZt
the state variable : (8a) specifically does not depend upon . Agents do not view  as informationdt%1 Zt Zt
about  since it is not a “signal” about unobserved private information they do not have. Indeed, theydt%1
know that all use the same public information.  However,  is crucial “news” about what the marketZt
thinks about  Hence, the importance of   is it’s great value in forecasting future endogenousdt%1! Zt
variables. Date t endogenous variables depend upon  and  future endogenous variables depend uponZt
future Z’s. Since market belief exhibits persistence, agents know that today’s market belief is useful for
forecasting future endogenous variables. How is this equilibrated?  This we show in Section 1.4.
1.4 Combining the Elements: the Implied Asset Pricing Under Diverse Beliefs
We now derive equilibrium prices and the risk premium. For details see Appendix A where we
also explain the term , which is the “adjusted” conditional variance of . We have also explainedσˆ2Q Qt%1
in 1.3 why the state variables in (2) are specified by the vector . Hence, rewrite (2) asψit ' (1 , dt ,Zt ,g
i
t )
(11) .θit(pt) '
Rτ
r σˆ2Q
[ E it ( Qt%1) % uψ
i
t] , u' ( u0 , u1 , u2 , u3 ) , ψ
i
t ' ( 1 , dt , Zt ,g
i
t )
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For an equilibrium to exist we need some stability conditions. First we require the interest rate r to be
positive,  R = 1 + r > 1 so that   . Now we add:0 <
1
R
< 1
(12) Stability Conditions: We require that     . 0 < λd < 1 , λZ < 1 , 0 < λZ % λ
g
Z < 1
The first requires {dt , t = 1, 2, ...}  to be stable and have an empirical distribution. The second is a
stability of belief condition. It requires i to believe  is stable. To see why, take expectations of(dt , Zt)
(8b), average over the population and recall that  Zt  are market averages of the . This implies that g
i
t
(13) .E¯t [Zt%1 ] ' (λZ % λ
g
Z )Zt
Theorem 2: Consider the model with heterogenous beliefs under the stability conditions specified with
supply of shares which equals 1. Then there is a unique equilibrium price function which takes the form  
.pt ' ad dt % aZ Zt % P0
Proof:  Average (11), use the fact that the aggregate stock supply is 1 and rearrange to have
(14)   .
r σˆ2Q
Rτ
' [ E¯t(pt%1%dt%1%µ ) & Rpt % (u0%u1dt% (u2%u3)Zt) ]
Now use the perception models (8a)-(8b) about the state variables, average them over the population
and use the definition of  Zt  to deduce the following relationships which are the key implications of
treating individual and market beliefs as state variables
(15a) E¯t(dt%1 % µ ) ' λddt % µ % λ
g
d Zt
(15b) E¯t [Zt%1 ] ' (λZ%λ
g
Z)Zt
Using these to solve for date t price we deduce
(16) pt '
1
R
[ E¯t(pt%1 )] %
1
R
[ (λd % u1)dt % (λ
g
d % u2 % u3)Zt] %
1
R
[ µ % u0] &
rσˆ2Q
R 2τ
(16) shows that equilibrium price is the solution of a linear difference equation  in the two state
variables  . Hence,  a standard argument (see Blanchard and Kahn(1980), Proposition 1, page(dt , Zt)
1308) shows that the solution is 
 (17a) pt ' ad dt % aZ Zt % P0
To match coefficients use (17a) to insert (15a) - (15b) into (16) and conclude that
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 (17b)  . ad '
λd % u1
R & λd
 (17c)  aZ '
( ad % 1)λ
g
d % ( u2 % u3 )
R& (λZ%λ
g
Z )
 (17d) .P0 '
(µ % u0)
r
&
σˆ
2
Q
Rτ
The stability conditions ensure that  (17a) -  (17d) is the unique solution as asserted.  
Since we do not have a closed form solution for the hedging demand parameters  weu' (u0 ,u1 ,u2 ,u3 )
computed numerical Monte Carlo solutions. For all relevant values of the model parameters we find
 and . These are reasonable conclusions:   increases with higher  and with higher -ad >0 aZ >0 pt d t Zt
today’s market belief in higher future dividends.
1.5 Equilibrium Risk Premium Under Heterogenous Beliefs
1.5.1 The Main Equilibrium Results
Under heterogenous beliefs we have diverse concepts of risk premia and one chooses a concept
which is appropriate for an application. The risk premium on a long position, as a random variable, is
(18)         .
πt%1 '
pt%1 % dt%1 % µ & Rpt
pt
(18) is a random variable measuring actual excess returns of stocks over the riskless bond. The need is
to measure the premium as a known expected quantity, recognized by participants. We have three such
measures. The first is the subjective expected excess returns by agent i, computed by using the
equilibrium map (17a) and the perception model (8a) -(8c) to show that
(19) 1
pt
E it (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(ad%1)(λd dt%λ
g
dg
i
t )%aZ(λZZt%λ
g
Zg
i
t )%µ%P0&Rpt]
Aggregating over i, the market premium is the average market expected excess returns. This perceived
premium reflects what the market expects, not what it receives. From (19) it is measured by
(20) 1
pt
E¯t(pt%1 % dt%1 % µ & Rpt ) ' '
1
pt
[(ad%1)(λddt%λ
g
d Zt) % aZ(λZZt % λ
g
ZZt)%µ %P0&Rpt]
Neither (19)  nor (20) are objective risk premia. We thus turn to an objective measure, common to all
agents, computed by agents studying the long term time variability of the premium and measuring it by
the empirical distribution of (18). Using (17a) and the stationary transition (7a)-(7b) we have
(21) E mt [πt%1] '
1
pt
E mt [pt%1%dt%1%µ &Rpt] '
1
pt
[( ad%1)(λddt)%aZ (λZ )Zt %µ %P0&Rpt]
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Observe that (21) is the way Econometricians and all researchers cited above have measured the risk
premium. For this reason we refer to it as “the” risk premium. 
We arrive at two conclusions. First, the differences between the premia in (19) and (20) is
(22a) .
1
pt
E it (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) &
1
pt
E¯t( pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d% aZλ
g
Z] ( g
i
t & Zt )
This says that from the perspective of trading, all that matters is the difference  of individualg it & Zt
from market belief.  Also, the risk premium is different from the market perceived premium when Z …0.
(22b) .1
pt
E mt (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) &
1
pt
E¯t( pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) ' &
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d% aZλ
g
Z] Zt
The more important conclusion is derived by combining (20) with (22b). By (17c) we have
, hence we can deduce the main result:&(u2%u3)'&aZ( R&λZ)% [(ad%1)λ
g
d%aZλ
g
Z]
 
Theorem 3:  The equilibrium risk premium has the following analytical expression
(23a)
1
pt
E mt (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(
r σˆ2Q
Rτ
& u0 & u1dt) & aZ (R & λZ) Zt]
Since az > 0,   R > 1 and  it follows thatλZ < 1
(23b) the Risk Premium   is decreasing in the mean market belief   .E mt [πt%1] Zt
Conclusions (23a) -(23b) are central.  (23a) and the earlier results exhibit the Endogenous Uncertainty
component of the risk premium which we call “The Market Belief Risk Premium.” It shows that market
belief has a complex effect on market risk premia. The effect of belief consist of two parts
(I) The first is the direct effect of market beliefs on the permanent mean premium . It is
r σˆ2Q
Rτ
shown in the Appendix that there exist weights  such that (ω1 ,ω12,ω2 )
      .σˆ2Q ' Var
i
t ((ω1(λddt % λ
g
d g
i
t %ω12ρ
id
t%1)%ω2 (λZ Zt%λ
g
Zg
i
t %ω12ρ
iZ
t%1 ))
Volatility of individual and market belief, which we call “Endogenous Uncertainty” contributes
directly to the volatility of excess returns and increases permanently the risk premium.
(II)  The second is the effect of market belief on the time variability of the risk premium,
reflected in    with a negative sign when Zt > 0.& aZ (R & λZ) Zt
To explain this second result we note that it says that if one runs a regression of excess returns on the
observable variables, the effect of the market belief on long term excess return is negative. This sign is
surprising since when Zt > 0 the market expects above normal future dividends but in that case the risk
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premium on the stock is lower. When Zt < 0 the market holds bearish belief about future dividend but
the risk premium is higher. Since we have data on Zt and on the distribution of belief the result will be
empirically tested. Before proceeding to the empirical test we discuss some ramifications of this result. 
1.5.2 The Market Belief Risk Premium is Fully General
The main result (23b) was derived from the assumed exponential utility function. We argue that
this result is more general and depends only on the positive coefficient  az  of  in the price map. ToZt
show this, assume any additive utility function over consumption and a risky asset which pays a
“dividend” or any other random payoff . Denote the price map by . We are interesteddt pt ' Φ( dt , Zt )
in the slope of the excess return function  with respect to . Focusing only on the numeratorE mt [πt%1] Zt
, linearize the price around  0 and write . TheE mt [ pt%1 % dt%1 % µ & Rpt] pt ' Φddt % ΦZZt %Φ0
desired result depends only upon the condition . It is reasonable as it requires current price toΦZ > 0
increases if the market is more optimistic about the asset’s future payoffs. To prove the point note that 
 E mt [ pt%1% (dt%1%µ)&Rpt] . E
m
t [Φddt%1%ΦZZt%1%Φ0% (dt%1%µ)&R(Φddt%ΦZZt%Φ0 )]
      .
' [(Φd%1)λd & RΦd]dt&ΦZ(R & λZ)Zt% [µ%Φ0 ( 1&R)]
The desired result follows from the fact that ,  R > 1 and . ΦZ > 0 λZ < 1
The price map might be more complicated. If we write it as  where X arept ' Φ( dt , Zt , Xt )
other state variables (in particular, the distribution of wealth), the analysis is more complicated since we
need to specify a complete model for forecasting  but the main result continues to hold.Xt%1
1.5.3 Interpretation of the Market Belief Risk Premium
Why is the effect of  Zt on the risk premium negative? Since this result is general and applicable
to any asset with risky payoffs, we offer a general interpretation. Our result shows that when the market
holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset the market views the long position as
less risky and consequently the risk premium on the long position of the asset falls. Fluctuating market
belief implies time variability of risk premia but more specifically, in the long run fluctuations in risk
premia are inversely related to the degree of market optimism about future prospects of asset payoffs.
To explore the result, it is important to explain what it does not say. One could interpret it to
confirm a common claim that to maximize excess returns it is optimal to be a “contrarian” to the market
consensus. To understand why this is a false interpretation note that when an agent holds a belief
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about future dividends, the market belief  Zt  does not offer him new information to alter his belief
about dividends. If the agent believes future dividends will be abnormally high but , the agentZt < 0
does not change his forecast of . He uses Zt only to forecast future prices. Hence, Zt is a crucialdt%1
input to forecasting returns without changing the forecast of . Since given the available informationdt%1
and his probability belief, which is, say,  an optimizing agent is already on his demand function. HeΓi
does not just abandon his demand by replacing  with the empirical measure m. This argument isΓi
analogous to the one showing why it is not optimal to adopt the log utility as your utility even though it
maximizes the growth rate of your wealth. Yes, it does that, but you dislike the sharp declines which
you expect to occur in the value of your assets if you follow the strategy called for by the log utility. By
analogy, following a “contrarian” policy implies a high long run average return in accord with  m  since
this is what (23a) says. But if your subjective model disagrees with the probability m  you will dislike
being short when your optimal position should be long. This argument explains why most people do not
systematically bet against the market, as a “contrarian” strategy (23a) would dictate. 
Taking a positive view, our results show that fluctuations in market belief are crucial for the
time variability of the risk premium and the market pricing of risk. Market optimism in bull markets or
pessimism in bear markets have drastic effects on market risk perception. A bull market is a market in
which risk perception is low and a bear market is one in which risk perception is high. Our result (23a)
shows that on average, market optimism induces lower risk premium and market pessimism generate
high risk premium. But due to diverse beliefs the individually perceived premia are diverse. To see this
use (19) and (21) to show that perceived premia are  . Hence,E it (πt%1)'E
m
t (πt%1)%
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d%λ
g
Z]g
i
t
optimizing agents take into account information about   in calculating their premia. From theirZt
perspective the state variable  is used to assess risk in the same way as NFP is used to assess the riskZt
of recessions and hence the market risk premium. We turn now to an empirical test of our theory. 
2. Testing of the Endogenous Time Variability of the Risk Premium: The Data
2.1 The Forecast Data
We use data on the distribution of commercial forecasts and take them as proxies for forecasts
made by the general public. The data is circulated monthly by the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts
(BLUF). It provides forecasts of over 50 economists at major corporations and financial institutions.
The number of forecasters may vary from month to month and, due to mergers and other
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organizational changes, the list of potential forecasters also changes over time. A sample of
forecasters includes Moody's Investors Service, Prudential Securities, Inc. Ford Motor Company,
Macroeconomic Advisers LLC, Goldman Sachs & Co., DuPont, J. P. Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch,
Fannie Mae, and others.  BLUF reports forecasts of  U.S. interest rates at all maturities along with
forecasts of GDP growth and inflation. Forecasts reported in BLUF are collected on the 24th and 25th
of each month and released to subscribers on the first day of the following month.
The BLUF publishes, for each variable, individual and mean (“consensus”) forecasts. The
mean is taken over all forecasters participating in that month. Forecasts are made for several quarters
into the future. For each horizon forecasters are asked to forecast the average value of that variable
during the future quarter in question. Note, the realized value of any variable for the quarter in which
forecasts are released is not known at forecasting time since such data is available only after the
quarter ends. As a result, each set of forecasts includes “current quarter” forecast which is denoted by
the horizon  h = 0. Hence,  h = 1 means “the quarter following the quarter in which the forecasts were
made.”  The BLUF publication was initiated in 1983:01 and circulated forecast data with horizons of
h = 0,1,...,4 quarters. The initial version of the files provided data for the Fed Fund rate, 1-month
Commercial Paper rate, 3-month T-Bill rate, 30-year Treasury Bonds rate, AAA long term corporate
bonds rate, growth rates of GNP, changes in the GNP deflator and CPI. In 1988:01 the BLUF added 
individual and market mean forecasts to complete the yield curve on treasury securities covering also
maturities of  6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years and 10 years. In 1992:01 forecasts of GNP and GNP
deflator were replaced by forecasts of GDP and GDP deflator. The switch coincided with the
substitution of GNP by GDP undertaken by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In 1997:01 the
forecast horizon was expanded by one quarter and from that date h = 0,1,...,5 quarters. Hence, a
uniform panel data set for the entire term structure of interest rates is available starting in 1988:01.
The data set has undergone other minor changes since its first release but these are not relevant to this
paper and are thus not reported here.
In the empirical work we use a month as a unit of time. Hence, our first task was to translate
quarterly mean forecasts to monthly forecasts. This was accomplished by an interpolation procedure
which selected for each date t and for each variable the B-form of a least squares cubic spline
piecewise polynomial which  minimized the squared deviations from the given forecasts. When a
variable is recorded monthly then all forecasters actually know at each date the realized monthly
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variable at hand for those months of the present quarter which have already past. This clearly applies
to all interest rate data. Hence, it was useful to include in all interpolations past realized data of the
variable in question for one quarter before date t (hence, three monthly observations). This procedure
improves continuity at date t. An optimal polynomial is computed for each date and utilizes no future
market data of any kind. At the end of the interpolation we have monthly data with monthly forecast
horizons h=1,2,...,12.
The forecasts reported in BLUF are labeled by their release date, which is the start of each
month. Hence, these forecasts are conditional on information available at the moment the forecasts
were collected which is the end of the month previous to release. For example, data released  in
1988:01 is  recorded in our “sample period” as 1987:12 since the data released on January 1, 1988 is
based on information available to forecasters at a date identified by us as 1987:12. Therefore all dates
in this paper should be considered as identified with the end of the month. The data set has been
updated in a format suitable for computations up to 2003:11.
2.2 Extracting Market States of Belief
The concepts of individual and market states of belief are central to the empirical work and we
now explain how they are constructed. For any variable X denote by  agent i’s conditionalE it {Xt%h}
forecast of  at date t and by  the forecast under the stationary probability m. Agent i’sXt%h E
m
t {Xt%h}
state of belief about  is then defined byXt%h
  .Z(X,h,i)t ' E
i
t {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}
This expression aims to remove from   the effect of other state variables and we test later theZ(X,h,i)t
robustness of this procedure. Since is the deviation from the stationary forecast, it must beZ(X,h,i)t
interpreted properly. Thus, suppose  y is growth rate of GDP. When  the agent isZ(y,h ,i)t > 0
“optimistic” about future growth but it does not mean he believes output will necessarily go up. He
does believe output will grow faster than “normal,” defined by the growth rate expected under  m.
The market state of belief is defined by 
 Z(X,h)t '
1
N j
N
i'1
[ E it {Xt%h} & E
m
t {Xt%h} ] ' E¯t{Xt%h} & E
m
t {Xt%h}
and the cross sectional variance of beliefs is
(σt
(X,h))2'
1
Nj
N
i'1
[E it {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}]& [E¯t {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}]
2
'
1
Nj
N
i'1
E it {Xt%h}& E¯t {Xt%h}
2
.
Since is the mean forecast, reflects the market’s views about economic conditionsE¯t{Xt%h} Z
(X,h)
t
6  The data is publically available on Watson’s web page   http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~mwatson/publi.html  
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which are different at t from what expected under  m. These differences are the reason why the
market forecasts and not . “Optimism” or “pessimism” depend upon the context.E¯t{Xt%h} E
m
t {Xt%h}
For example,  means the market is optimistic about abnormally high output growth in  t+h.Z(y,h)t > 0
If  is  j maturity  interest rate, then  means the market expects this rate to be higher thanR(j) Z(j ,h)t > 0
normal at t+h. The market belief about Fed Funds rates is a belief about future monetary policy.
Hence,  means the market expects an abnormally tight monetary policy. Note that in thisZ(F,h)t > 0
paper, all belief variables are about future interest rates. 
To measure we need data on the two components which define it. BLUF files provideZ(X,h)t
direct data on  and as discussed. We have monthly forecast data on interest rates atE it {Xt%h} E¯t{Xt%h}
different maturities, GDP growth , change in the CPI and the GDP deflator. The key issue is thus the
construction of the stationary forecasts . These forecasts are made with a model that takesE mt {Xt%h}
into account all data that was available at date t hence we take into account the release date of each
variable used in the following analysis. A feature of stationarity is time invariance, implying the model
is valid out of sample. This is an idealization which we can only approximate, given the relatively
limited data set which we have.  We thus compute employing the Stock and Watson’sE mt {Xt%h}
(1999), (2001), (2002), (2005) method of diffusion indices. We briefly explain this procedure.
We started with the Stock and Watson’s data set6 developed by Data Resources and Global
Insight. It contains 215 monthly time series for the US from 1959:01 to 2003:12, covering the main
sectors of the economy. As discussed in Stock and Watson (2005), the series are transformed by
taking logarithms and/or by differencing. In general, first differences of logarithms (growth rates) are
used for real quantity variables, first differences are used for nominal interest rates, and second
differences of logarithms (changes in growth rates) for price series. Because of missing data we use
(see Stock and Watson (2005)) only 127 series from 1959:01 to 2003:12. These represent ten main
categories of economic variables: consumption, employment, exchange rates, housing starts, interest
rates, money aggregates, prices, real output, stock prices and the University of Michigan Index of
Consumer Expectations. Stacking them, we obtain an information matrix of dimension 540 by 127.
One of Stock and Watson’s (1999) conclusion is that effective time invariant models need to employ
a small number of variables. The reason for this observation is that linear forecasting models with a
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large number of variables are unstable and forecast poorly out of sample. The Stock-Watson method
reduces the rank of the matrix but keeps as much information as possible by creating diffusion indices
constructed via principal component analysis to extract factors that best explain the variance of the
information matrix. 
For the period at hand the five greatest factors explain 43% of the variation in the information
matrix and with twenty factors the variance explained is 74%. However, the marginal contribution of
a factor declines rapidly implying that little marginal explanatory power is gained when using more
than a few factors. Indeed, since we study interest rates which are rather persistent, nothing in this
paper is changed by using more than four factors in the stationary forecasting scheme we adopt
below. Stock and Watson (2002) concluded that a combination of factors and lags of the forecasted
variable is the best information set. For any variable X the objective is to compute forecasts of
using information at time t. In all regressions of Section 3 we need stationary forecasts of marketXt%h
nominal interest rates and for these variables the forecasts are constructed as follows: 
(i) let  denote the stationary h-period change in a nominal interest rate and  for
∆xT%h'XT%h&XT F
i
T
 denote the first four factors deduced from date T information matrix;i'1,..., 4
(ii) estimate the parameters by the following OLS regression:
αˆ
h, βˆ
h,i
, γˆh
     ;∆xT%h ' α
h
%
j
4
i ' 1
β
h,iF iT % γ
h
∆xT % gT%h, for T ' 1,...,t&h
(iii) the forecasts of at date t are then given by:
∆ˆxt%h
         .∆ˆxt%h,t ' αˆ
h
%
j
4
i ' 1
βˆ
h,i
F it % γˆ
h
∆xt
Finally, the stationary forecasts of the interest rates are . A similar procedureE mt {Xt%h} ' Xt % ∆ˆxt%h,t
is used for the GDP deflator except that .∆xT%h'XT%h
Real Time vs. A Single Estimate. Had our data set been very long, the stationary forecast
 could be constructed from any long time interval and, as noted in Section 1.1, it would beE mt {Xt%h}
time invariant. However, since our data set is short and we examine the forecastability of excess
returns, we do not use the factor loadings of a single model estimated for the entire period 1959:01 to
2003:12 combined. Instead, all our estimates of  and are made by using real timeE mt {Xt%h} Z
(X,h)
t
forecasts. For each date in the sample we thus use data from 1959:01 up to the given date in order to
recompute the factor loadings, reestimate a stationary model with which we compute  andE mt {Xt%h}
then deduce the values of .Z(X,h)t
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Tables 1A and 1B provide some summary statistics of a sample of extracted market belief
variables  .  The last column in Table 1A reports the first order autocorrelation parameter.Z(X,h)t
Although theory requires each market belief to have a long term time average equal to zero, it is clear
the means over short time periods are not zero. Indeed, the fact that the belief indices for inflation and
nominal interest rates have positive time averages for the period at hand is significant. It reflects the
forecasting bias in the US during that era when beliefs in inflation and doubts about the efficacy of
monetary policy persisted (see Kurz (2005)) despite the mounting evidence against these beliefs. Note
also the autocorrelation coefficients which are compatible with the Markov dynamics of belief in (4).
Table 1A: Summary Statistics of Market Beliefs
h = 6 Months or 2 Quarters  Ahead Time Average Standard Deviation Autocorrelation
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 0.273
 0.238
 0.365
0.528
0.429
0.595
0.700
0.735
0.674
h = 12 Months  or 4 Quarters Ahead
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 0.267
 0.385
 0.398
0.763
0.681
0.798
0.632
0.841
0.740
Table 1B: Correlation Matrix of  Market Beliefs
6 Months or 2 Quarters Ahead Fed Fund rate 1 year T-bill rate GDP deflator 
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 1.000
 0.850
 0.363
 1.000
 0.298  1.000
12 Months or 4 Quarters Ahead
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 1.000
 0.856
 0.516
 1.000
 0.523  1.000
To illustrate, Figure 1 traces the graph of  for the 6-months T-bill rate with horizons Z(6 ,h)t
h = 4, 12. The figure shows the belief indexes exhibit large fluctuations ranging from -1.5% to +2.5%.
which are very significant from the economic point of view.  In Figure 2 we trace the time variability
of the cross-sectional standard deviations of the  across i, for horizons h = 4, 12. It isσt
(6 ,h) Z(6 ,h ,i)t
clear from the figure that the dispersion of beliefs increases with the forecasting horizon. This is a
common feature of all data on belief distributions.
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2.3 Data on Realized Market Interest Rates, Rates of Return and Excess Returns
Treasury Bills market.  Theory suggests we work with interest rates implied by zero coupon
bond prices hence we used data on zero coupon securities with maturities of 1 to 18 months, based
on the Fama-Bliss file (see Fama and Bliss (1987)). The data up to 2003:11 was generated by a
FORTRAN routines (provided by R.R. Bliss), using a method developed by Bliss for the unsmoothed
Fama-Bliss data set (see Bliss (1997)). Let  be the one period excess holding returns of T Bills
π
(j,h)
t%h
with (j + h) maturity held for  h periods and sold at maturity  j. It can be measured as a monthly or an
Figure 1: 6-month Treasury Bill rate: 4 and 12(dashed line) month ahead Market Belief Z (6)t
Figure 2: 6-month Treasury Bill rate: 4 and 12(dashed line) month ahead standard deviation of Market Belief  Z (6)t
7 Traders are required to put up good faith security deposit which is a margin collateral to ensure they honor their
pledge for the deposit as agreed. The collateral securities are owned by the parties to the contract who continue to benefit from
any return to their investments. Margin cash is often held in the form of T Bills which yield interest to the owner. Hence a
buyer or seller of a futures contract do not have any investment or opportunity cost except for the risk they take on the actual
Fed Funds rate that would prevail at settlement. In this sense this market permits agents to trade risk of future monetary policy
actions.  
23
annualized rate since all we say here about T Bills is independent of the unit of time selected. We
study the h - month excess holding returns defined by 
hπ(j,h)t%h ' (j%h)R
(j%h)
t & jR
(j)
t%h & hR
(h)
t
where is the one period interest rate implied by a zero coupon bond with maturity at τ. We studyR (τ)t
the two maturities j = 3 and 6 months. All data on the right hand side of the expression are then
available in the Fama-Bliss file described above. The limiting factor in the study of this market is the
BLUF data hence the period of analysis is 1987:12- 2003:11.
It is useful to clarify the trading mechanics needed to realize h period holding returns earned
by selling a specified debt τ dates in the future. For example, to sell a six month Treasury Bill 12
month from now one must buy a Treasury Bond with maturity of 18 months and sell it 12 month from
now. Returns on this long position consist of interest earned plus capital gains or losses realized.
Federal Fund Futures market. The second set of markets are for non contingent Federal
Funds futures contracts with diverse monthly settlement horizons. A Fed Funds futures contract
enables buyers and sellers to trade the risk of the Fed Funds rate that would prevail at the time of
settlement. Hence this is the risk of the future target of the Fed Fund rate that would be fixed by the
Fed’s FOMC. Fed funds futures have traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) since October
1988 and settle based on the mean Fed fund rate that prevails over a specified calendar month. The
mean is computed as a simple average of the daily averages published by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. Hence, a trader needs to forecast the average federal fund rate during the contract month.
The contract horizon is the number of months prior to the settlement date when a trader commits to
go long or short such a contract. Contracts are settled by cash by the end of the contract month. Keep
in mind that traders of such contracts do not invest capital and do not incur any opportunity cost7;
they commit at t to a contract rate which becomes the contract cost basis at settlement, h F (h)t
months later.  h = 3 means a three-month-ahead  contract horizon. Data on are then recorded byF (h)t
the exchange and become public information. Some missing observations arise if a contract is not
8 The CBOT uses the 360 day year as the basic convention for quotation of interest rate and conversion from annual
to monthly rates. The CBOT provides more details on its web page.
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traded. Let us now explain the risks and rewards of a trader in this market.
The trader with a long position (the “buyer”) of a Fed Funds futures contract owns a contract
under which an interest rate of is paid on a $5 million deposit for a month during month t + h.F (h)t
is quoted as an annual rate. Denote by  the actual average annualized Fed Funds rate duringF (h)t R
(F)
t%h
settlement month, h  months later. Let  n  be the number of days in the contract month then at
settlement a seller pays and a buyer receives for each contract the cash amount8 
.$Profits ' [ F (h)t & R
(F)
t%h]×
n
360
×$5,000,000
It is then clear the parties trade the risk of  which is the risk of the rate set by the Open MarketR (F)t%h
Committee. It is reasonable to define the excess return of any gamble in this market to be defined by 
π
(F,h)
t%h ' F
(h)
t & R
(F)
t%h
Data on   is recorded by CBOT while data on  is reported by the Federal Reserve. Given theF (h)t R
(F)
t%h
data set available the period for analysis of this market is 1988:10- 2003:11.
The problem of serial correlation.  Serial correlation in forecast errors is inevitable for well known
reasons. Computing excess returns utilizes overlapping data and this fact leads us to report in work
below robust standard errors of estimates. We compute standard errors using the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation (HAC) procedure for robust estimates developed by Hodrick (1992), which
generalizes the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) method. This correction places full weight on the lags of
serial correlation in excess returns. We thus compute HAC robust standard errors with h-1 lags.
3. Analysis of the Risk Premium in the Bond and Federal Fund Futures Markets
3.1 Estimating Risk Premium Functions
We now study the contribution of market belief to long term forecasting of excess returns and
test the validity of the theoretical conclusions (23a)-(23b) about the effect of market belief on the time
variability of market risk premia. Excess holding returns on three assets are studied: three month
Treasury Bills and six month Treasury Bills with holding periods from 1 to 12 moths, and Federal
Funds Futures contracts with holding periods of 1 to 6 months. For any asset X we estimate linear
excess return functions of the following general form
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(24)  π(X,h)t%h 'α
(X,h)
0 %α
(X,h)
1 Mt%α
(X,h)
2 Yt%ε
(X,h)
t%h
where  is a vector of macroeconomic variables and  is a vector of market belief variables to beMt Yt
specified. Since the risk premium is estimated in (24) using the long term statistics, it follows that
variables in  add something new which is not in the market data . Yt Mt
To specify  and  note that under an exponential utility the risk premium is a function ofYt Mt
the mean market belief only; no other moments matter. For more general utility functions the entire
distribution matters and we thus take into account additional moments of this distribution. To that
end we study below the following three variables about any asset X:
 –  date t  mean market belief about X at future date t+h&Z (X,h)t
    –  date t cross sectional standard deviations of individual beliefs about X at future date t+h. σ(X,h)t
These two variables are clear: they are simply the first two moments of the distribution of individual
beliefs. Note the negative sign in . It results from our convention to describe belief as in (8a)-&Z (X,h)t
(8c). Belief variables are oriented so that a positive belief is perceived beneficial to a long position.
Since a belief in a higher future interest rate is a belief in a lower future price of debt, a belief which is
beneficial to a long position in debt is a belief in lower rather than higher interest rates. 
The macroeconomic variables in  are natural and reflect the literature on excess return onMt
debt instruments and futures markets as noted in the introductory section. First, following Piazzesi
and Swanson (2004) who concentrated on the cyclical variable, we use the following three
macroeconomic variables in estimating risk premium in the Federal Funds futures market:
 - lagged year over year growth rate of Non Farm Payroll;NFPt&1
 - lagged year over year change in the consumer price index ;CPIt&1
Ft  -   the Federal Funds rate, reflecting the state of monetary policy at t.
Turning to past yields, recall that  Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) stressed the predictive power of past
yields. Thus, we use yield variables to assess the risk premium in markets for 3 month and 6 month
Treasury Bills. We introduce data on yields of Treasuries with 18 maturities covering 1970:01 to
2003:11. To reduce the dimension of information we computed principal components in real time (i.e. 
employ data up to t) and in all estimates we use the first three factors with notation , υ =1,2,3.R Fυt
These three factors account for 98% of the total variance of the yields’ information matrix.
Comments on the time unit are useful. Rates of return on holding T Bills are naturally annual
rates and hence comparable across different T Bills and horizons. This is not the case of Fed Funds
26
futures. Total returns on such futures are measured in percentage points for the length of time the
contracts are held consequently they are not annualized. Returns on short duration contracts are
typically smaller than returns on long duration contracts hence excess returns on holding Fed Funds
futures are not entirely comparable with returns on holding an asset with clearly defined holding cost. 
This lack of comparability should be kept in mind in any cross-table comparisons. Tables 2A-
2C present parameter estimates of (24) for the three markets reporting the shortest, the longest and
medium  horizons. (*) denotes significance at 10% level and (†) denotes significance at 5% level or
lower. All are adjusted and standard errors are reported in parenthesis.R 2
          Table 2A: Federal Fund Futures Market - Time Variability of Excess Returns
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft σ
(F,h)
t &Z
(F,h)
t R
2
Chow
Test
p-value
h=1  0.011
(0.025)
 0.012 
(0.009)
 0.005
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.008)
 0.010
(0.141)
-0.234 †
(0.047)
0.237  0.351
h=3 -0.015
(0.081)
-0.079 †
(0.034)
-0.003 
(0.037)
 0.060 †
(0.028)
-0.543
(0.352)
-0.321 †
(0.056)
0.311 0.000
h=6 -0.199
(0.136)
-0.284 †
(0.047)
-0.056
(0.085)
 0.233 †
(0.042)
-0.413 
(0.455)
-0.397 †
(0.130)
0.407 0.000
Table 2B: 3 Months Treasury Bills Market - Time Variability of Excess Returns
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(3,h)
t &Z
(3,h)
t R
2 ChowTest
p-value
h=1 -0.905 
(0.736)
 0.084 †
(0.036)
 0.023
(0.048)
 0.142
(0.098)
-0.542 * 
(0.325)
-0.321 †
(0.076)
 0.075
(0.058)
-0.238
(0.702)
-1.636 †
(0.165)
0.482  0.026
h=3  0.786 *
(0.463)
-0.100 †
(0.044)
-0.026
(0.034)
 0.032
(0.065)
 0.243 
(0.221)
-0.147 †
(0.055)
-0.061
(0.046)
-0.997 †
(0.381)
-0.729 †
(0.104)
0.450 0.116
h=5  1.147 †
(0.571)
-0.176 †
(0.024)
-0.015 
(0.046)
-0.013
(0.088)
 0.517 *
(0.272)
 0.019
(0.061)
-0.045 
(0.051)
-0.388 
(0.245)
-0.345 †
(0.081)
0.391 0.110
h=7  1.620 †
(0.592)
-0.204 †
(0.026)
-0.001 
(0.040)
-0.073
(0.080)
 0.734 †
(0.271)
 0.012
(0.054)
-0.033
(0.047)
-0.171 
(0.214)
-0.198 †
(0.060)
0.466 0.008
h=9  2.076 †
(0.437)
-0.160 †
(0.023)
 0.006 
(0.029)
-0.125
(0.052)
 0.974 †
(0.192)
-0.003
(0.046)
-0.015
(0.045)
-0.330 
(0.203)
-0.306 †
(0.049)
0.607 0.005
h=12  1.684 †
(0.593)
-0.200 †
(0.021)
 0.004 
(0.026)
-0.029
(0.079)
 0.749 †
(0.295)
-0.068
(0.038)
-0.012
(0.026)
-0.403 †
(0.097)
-0.180 †
(0.027)
0.673 0.434
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Table 2C: 6 Months Treasury Bills Market - Time Variability of Excess Returns
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(6,h)
t &Z
(6,h)
t R
2 ChowTest
p-value
h=1 -1.002 
(1.371)
 0.142 * 
(0.079)
 0.015
(0.091)
 0.151 
(0.188)
-0.820 
(0.604)
-0.693 †
(0.138)
 0.119
(0.113)
-1.028 
(1.614)
-3.309 †
(0.267)
0.575  0.087
h=3  1.153 
(1.103)
-0.211 †
(0.089)
-0.069
(0.082)
 0.105
(0.160)
 0.338 
(0.510)
-0.337 †
(0.105)
-0.037 
(0.097)
-2.170 †
(0.871)
-1.703 †
(0.161)
0.470 0.772
h=5  2.342 
(1.432)
-0.380 †
(0.066)
-0.071 
(0.098)
 0.008
(0.196)
 1.114 *
(0.648)
 0.054
(0.123)
-0.079
(0.102)
-1.084 *
(0.562)
-0.876 †
(0.156)
0.455 0.226
h=7  2.835 †
(1.300)
-0.422 †
(0.075)
-0.075 
(0.082)
 0.013
(0.178)
 1.311 †
(0.613)
-0.032
(0.109)
-0.040
(0.106)
-0.816 †
(0.384)
-0.605 †
(0.102)
0.540 0.005
h=9  3.448 †
(1.102)
-0.368 †
(0.074)
-0.042 
(0.059)
-0.074
(0.145)
 1.579 †
(0.546)
-0.137 
(0.091)
-0.034
(0.080)
-0.936 †
(0.377)
-0.619 †
(0.105)
0.649 0.051
h=12  4.069 †
(1.253)
-0.401 †
(0.059)
-0.004 
(0.050)
-0.173
(0.162)
 1.812 †
(0.619)
-0.176 †
(0.085)
 0.024
(0.054)
-0.683 †
(0.212)
-0.388 †
(0.098)
0.664 0.114
3.2 Evaluating the Results
Considering Tables 2A-2C combined, we find that the pro-cyclical variable NFP used by
Piazzesi and Swanson (2004), and the yield variables used by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) are,
indeed, important components of the risk premium. We note however that only the first factor of
past yields is consistently significant.  Our central concern is the size and sign of the belief  variables. 
Starting with a statistical perspective, the effect of market belief is significant, large and
compatible in sign with the Market Risk Premium hypothesis in (23b). This constitutes an empirical
support for the hypothesis that, like society at large, markets are moved by perceptions. Fluctuations
of real pro-cyclical variables account for some variability of risk premia but variations in market
perceptions, which may express mistaken interest rate forecasts, are at least as important. Keeping
in mind our orientation convention, the parameters of the mean market beliefs  in Tables 2A-&Z (X,h)t
2C are always negative, they are large, always statistically significant and key contributors to the
high . Table 3 below provides a quantitative assessment of the contribution of these beliefR2
variables. Our hypothesis in (23b) is also compatible with the empirical results of Campbell and
Diebold (2005) and Baker and Wurgler (2006).
The parameters of  which measure market diversity, tend to be statistically significantσ(X,h)t ,
for longer time horizons. However, in the 6-month T Bill market these parameters  are consistently
significant for all horizons h > 2. For  3-month T Bills they are consistently significant at intermediate
and longer horizons, h = 3,4,10,11,12. With one exception, the estimates are always negative and
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large. This result says that  an increase in diversity of market opinions decreases the risk premium.
This same result was derived in our earlier theoretical work (see Kurz and Motolese (2001)). The
explanation given there is simple: markets with more diverse beliefs are more stable since beliefs tend
to cancel each other out, resulting in reduced price volatility. In essence, with increased diversity the
effects of the law of large numbers are more pronounced over time. The converse holds as well:
markets are more risky the higher is the degree of unanimity in them. In such markets small changes
in market news result in sharp change of prices when “too many people try to get through the same
door.” In Kurz and Motolese (2001) agents are risk averse without any constraints on credit or
short-sales . Our empirical results are consistent with Miller (1977). However, the theoretical
justification given by Miller’s (1977) model hinges upon the imposition of short-sale constraints. Our
results are also compatible with earlier results in the financial economics literature (see Diether et al.
(2002), Park (2005)). 
Non- Stationarity. Our theory hinges on agents not knowing the true structure of the economy
since it exhibits non-stationarity. In that case the risk premium has to exhibit non-stationarity as well.
To test for parameter time variability we could select dates when structural changes have been
studied by others. Our view is that forecast functions change for many reasons and practically any
date will do for a Chow test. Since the periods 1988:10- 2003:11 for Fed Funds and 1987:12-
2003:11 for T Bills are relatively short, we chose the mid-points of 1996:04 and 1995:11 to
maximize the number of observations per period. For these sub - periods we conduct Chow tests of
parameter time variability. In Tables 2A-2C, presented earlier, we report parameter estimates for the
entire period and, in the last columns, p-values of Chow tests for breaks in the two chosen dates.
Almost all Chow tests lead to a rejection of the hypothesis of structural parameter time invariance
in all markets. The Chow tests are particularly significant since we have only 91 observations for
Fed Futures and 96 for T Bills in each of the sub periods.
3.2.1. Robustness of the results.
We report in Table 3 the contributions of all belief variables to the .  Keeping in mind theR 2
limitation of the  we attach to it the Standard Errors of the regression. To further test theR 2
9 The Diebold-Mariano statistics have been computed according to the procedure reported in Aiolfi and Favero
(2005), Appendix B.
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robustness of the results, we also report the statistics of an in-sample Diebold-Mariano test9 where
(*) denotes significance at 10% level and (†) denotes significance at 5% level or lower. Table 3
reveals that belief variables explain a significant proportion of the risk premium.  At almost all 
Table  3: Contribution of Belief to Excess Returns Predictability
Asset Horizon
Without Beliefs With Beliefs
Diebold
Mariano
Statistic R 2 Std. Errors of
the regression
R 2 Std. Errors of
the regression
Fed Fund
Futures
h=1
h=3
h=6
-0.005
 0.139
 0.345
0.119
0.280
0.479
0.237
0.311
0.407
0.103
0.250
0.455
-1.922 *
-2.226 †
-0.848   
3 Months
T-Bill
h=1
h=3
h=5
h=7
h=9
h=12
 0.062
 0.208
 0.309
 0.425
 0.489
 0.595
0.671
0.368
0.306
0.254
0.247
0.214
0.482
0.450
0.391
0.466
0.607
0.673
0.499
0.307
0.287
0.245
0.216
0.192
 -6.125 † 
-3.794 †
-2.349 †
-1.834 *
-3.096 †
-3.300 †
6 Months
T-Bill
h=1
h=3
h=5
h=7
h=9
h=12
 0.077
 0.219
 0.349
 0.462
 0.541
 0.600
1.371
0.836
0.657
0.551
0.492
0.431
0.444
0.451
0.494
0.596
0.638
0.664
0.930
0.689
0.601
0.510
0.430
0.395
 -6.078 † 
-3.757 †
-2.710 †
-2.537 †
-2.639 †
-2.642 †
horizons the regressions which include belief variables outperform significantly those without. This is
seen from the consistent lower Standard Errors of the regressions with belief variables. Furthermore,
the Diebold-Mariano statistics are very significant. Their negative sign indicates that the total
distance between the fitted and realized excess holding returns is lower in the models with belief
variables than in those without. These two conclusions strengthen our results.
As indicated in Section 2.2 we constructed the with the aim of extracting theZ (X,h)t
component of beliefs in the forecast data which is uncorrelated with state variables. We now wish to
test for the actual correlation of the with the macro variables  in equation (24). We findZ (X,h)t Mt
significant correlation and report it in Table 4 where (*) denotes significance at 10% level and (†)
denotes significance at 5% level or lower. To test for the effect of this correlation on the estimates,
we orthogonalize the market belief variables with respect to a wide set of macro variablesZ (X,h)t
reported monthly. This includes all the variables  in the regression models (24) as well as theMt
lagged rate of unemployment, the lagged year over year change in industrial production and the
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lagged year over year change in housing starts. Orthogonalization is carried out by regressing Z (X,h)t
on the above variables and removing from them the predictable components while keeping the
unconditional means unchanged.
Table 4: Correlations of Belief Variables with Macro Variables from regression (24)
&Z (F,h)t &Z
(3,h)
t &Z
(6,h)
t
h=1 h=3 h=6 h=1 h=3 h=5 h=7 h=9 h=12 h=1 h=3 h=5 h=7 h=9 h=12
NFPt&1
CPIt&1
Ft
R F1t&1
R F2t&1
R F3t&1
    0.22 †
   -0.14 *
-0.03
----
----
----
   0.30 †
  -0.21 *
0.05
----
----
----
  0.48 †
-0.20 †
  0.24 †
----
----
----
    0.31 †
   -0.15 †
-0.00
 0.00
   -0.29 †
-0.04
    0.41 †
  -0.14 *
 0.11
 0.11
  -0.17 †
-0.00
    0.44 †
-0.04
    0.29 †
    0.26 †
  0.09
  0.03
    0.58 †
 0.04
    0.42 †
    0.42 †
-0.02
  0.03
    0.73 †
 0.05
    0.50 †
   0.53 †
 -0.19 †
0.02
   0.78 †
0.07
   0.56 †
   0.60 †
 -0.23 †
0.06
    0.27 †
   -0.20 †
-0.08
-0.07
   -0.27 †
 -0.04
   0.42 †
  -0.19 †
0.07
0.08
  -0.21 †
0.00
    0.50 †
-0.05
    0.31 †
    0.29 †
 0.08
 0.04
    0.66 †
 0.00
    0.43 †
    0.44 †
-0.08
 0.04
   0.76 †
0.01
   0.47 †
   0.51 †
  -0.25 †
0.02
   0.81 †
0.03
   0.53 †
   0.59 †
  -0.29 †
0.06
We recompute the regressions in Tables 2A-2C and report a sample of the new results in
Tables 5A-5C. These orthogonalized values of have zero correlation with the other macroZ (X,h)t
variables but the results in Tables 5A-5C are virtually the same.
        Table 5A: Federal Fund Futures Market - Orthogonal Belief Variables
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft σ
(F,h)
t &Z
(F,h)
t R
2
h=1 -0.005
(0.025)
-0.010 
(0.009)
 0.004
(0.012)
 0.006
(0.007)
-0.038
(0.145)
-0.256 †
(0.047)
0.258
h=6 -0.227
(0.135)
-0.330 †
(0.040)
 0.032
(0.075)
 0.198 †
(0.044)
-0.472 
(0.450)
-0.441 †
(0.127)
0.420
Table 5B: 3 Months Treasury Bills Market - Orthogonal Belief Variables
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(3,h)
t &Z
(3,h)
t R
2
h=1  1.100 
(0.753)
-0.163 †
(0.036)
 0.064
(0.048)
-0.038
(0.099)
 0.510 
(0.333)
-0.084 
(0.068)
-0.061
(0.063)
-0.245
(0.719)
-1.653 †
(0.167)
0.489
h=7  1.973 †
(0.643)
-0.240 †
(0.023)
 0.023 
(0.040)
-0.124
(0.087)
 0.867 †
(0.291)
-0.004
(0.054)
-0.024
(0.046)
-0.149 
(0.223)
-0.213 †
(0.064)
0.471
h=12  1.853 †
(0.538)
-0.259 †
(0.019)
 0.035 
(0.026)
-0.059
(0.072)
 0.786 †
(0.271)
-0.059
(0.035)
-0.017
(0.024)
-0.402 †
(0.092)
-0.193 †
(0.026)
0.679
Table 5C: 6 Months Treasury Bills Market - Orthogonal Belief Variables
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(6,h)
t &Z
(6,h)
t R
2
h=1  3.175 †
(1.389)
-0.468 † 
(0.073)
 0.069
(0.092)
-0.155 
(0.191)
 1.505 †
(0.617)
-0.172
(0.129)
-0.246
(0.119)
-1.046 
(1.623)
-3.332 †
(0.270)
0.579
h=7  3.777 †
(1.313)
-0.560 †
(0.064)
-0.004 
(0.081)
-0.118
(0.183)
 1.677 †
(0.620)
-0.060
(0.104)
-0.034
(0.102)
-0.750 *
(0.397)
-0.658 †
(0.090)
0.551
h=12  4.297 †
(1.159)
-0.547 †
(0.049)
 0.064 
(0.051)
-0.215
(0.148)
 1.856 †
(0.577)
-0.131 *
(0.075)
-0.005
(0.048)
-0.672 †
(0.218)
-0.424 †
(0.092)
0.672
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3.2.2 What Do Belief Variables Contribute?
Turning Points. To see how belief variables contribute to risk premium we exhibit in
Figures 3-5 the fitted and realized excess holding returns for a sample of three of our models, in
accord with the estimates in Tables 2A-2C. The figures show that the results for Fed Funds futures
are less precise than the results for T Bills. However, we note the great success of our estimated
model in predicting the turning points of the time series. This high accuracy is the crucial
contribution of the belief variables in capturing the time variability of the market’s risk premia. One
may also note that the belief variables enable the fitted values to match the realized data at high
frequency within the broader cyclical pattern.
To sum up our findings, from the econometric point of view we confirm the result of earlier work
which shows that pro-cyclical fundamental variables are important components of the time variability
of the risk premium. The new fundamental forces proposed in this paper are the beliefs of agents.
These variables make a clear and statistically significant contribution to the risk premium.
Figure 3: Excess returns on Fed Fund Futures contract 3 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values
from regression (24) 
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Figure 4: Excess returns on 3 Months TBill 6 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values from
regression (24)
Figure 5: Excess returns on 6 Months TBill 6 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values from
regression (24)
10 As pointed out earlier, theory requires that each market belief have a long term time average equal to zero. Due to
the short time span of the sample periods we have considered, the time averages of   are not zero. Z
(X,h)
t
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Magnitude of the Effect of Market Belief on the Risk Premium. We now evaluate the order of 
magnitude of the effects of beliefs on risk premia. Note first, that we cannot evaluate the total effect
since we do not have a measure of the constant effect of market beliefs on long term volatility of
asset returns, as measured by  in (23a). We can only measure the variable effect of[
r σˆ2Q
R τ
]
. Hence, our estimates are lower bounds only. To that end we provide in Table 6(σ(X,h)t , &Z
(X,h)
t )
some long term statistics on the belief variables during the period10 at hand. Together with the
estimated parameters in Tables 2A-2C we assess the effects, on market premia, of these variables
measured in units of standard deviations.
Table 6: Long Term Statistics of Belief Variables (in basis points)
σ
(F,h)
t σ
(3,h)
t σ
(6,h)
t Z
(F,h)
t Z
(3,h)
t Z
(6,h)
t
Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev.
h=1 10.4 6.8 15.4 7.4 16.7 7.7 4.5 26.9 7.5 32.4 10.9 36.6
h=3 17.4 9.0 22.7 9.3 24.0 9.4 15.6 41.7 14.5 31.9 20.0 34.6
h=5 25.9 12.1 30.9 12.7 32.3 12.4 26.4 52.5 24.7 39.6 28.9 41.0
h=6 30.4 14.1 35.1 14.4 36.3 13.8 27.3 52.8 25.2 41.6 29.3 42.3
h=7 ---- ---- 39.2 15.7 40.6 15.4 ---- ---- 27.3 46.5 31.7 47.1
h=9 ---- ---- 46.9 17.6 48.2 17.2 ---- ---- 28.7 56.2 34.2 59.0
h=12 ---- ---- 56.7 18.4 57.6 17.9 ---- ---- 33.1 73.1 39.6 75.4
  Such computations provide an idea of the order of magnitude of the effect of these changes. To
illustrate the effect we consider two cases: decreased optimism and increased diversity of market
opinions.
(1) The effect of decreased optimism. If we set   equal to two standard deviations above itsZ (X,h)t
mean during the studied period as in Table 6, the total effect on the risk premium is as follows:
-0.397×(-(27.3+105.4)) = +52.68 bp in the Federal Fund Futures Market when h = 6;
-0.180×(-(33.1+146.2)) = +32.27 bp in the 3 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12;
-0.388×(-(39.6+150.8)) = +73.88 bp in the 6 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12.
(2) The effect of diversity of market opinions. If we set  equal to two standard deviations aboveσ(X,h)t
its mean during the studied period as in Table 6, the total effect on the risk premium is as follows:  
-0.413×(30.4+14.1) = -18.38 bp in the Federal Fund Futures Market when h = 6;
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-0.403×(56.7+36.8) = -37.68 bp in the 3 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12;
-0.683×(57.6+35.8) = -63.79 bp in the 6 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12.
From the above we see that market pessimism can frequently account for an increase in the risk
premium of up to about 70 basis points while an increase in the diversity of market opinions can
frequently account for a decrease in the risk premium of up to about 60 basis points.
To measure the joint effect of the two belief variables  combined, weY (X,h)t '(σ
(X,h)
t , &Z
(X,h)
t )
denote by    the estimated value of the belief component of the risk premium inJ (X,h)t 'αˆ
(X,h)
2 CY
(X,h)
t
(24).   may be positive or negative and could thus increase or decrease the premium at anyJ (X,h)t
date. To measure an order of magnitude of the component of the risk premium at t relative toJ (X,h)t
the mean premium, let   be the mean of the .  Table 7 reports, for each asset, the|J (X,h)| |J (X,h)t |
unconditional annualized mean premium for the sample period and the annualized value of   .|J (X,h)|
Table 7: Component of Belief in the Premium (in basis points, annualized)
Fed Funds Futures 3 Months Treasury Bills 6 Months Treasury Bills
Mean
Premium |J
(F,h)| MeanPremium |J
(3,h)| MeanPremium
|J (6,h)|
h=1 41.2 54.1 46.1 38.3 68.1 88.6
h=3 49.1 46.5 32.5 21.9 55.2 50.8
h=5 67.5 46.5 28.2 12.0 53.0 31.7
h=6 68.8 34.0 27.2 11.5 54.2 34.9
h=7 ---- ---- 27.9 7.8 71.8 27.8
h=9 ---- ---- 28.8 16.5 69.8 39.3
h=12 ---- ---- 38.9 18.5 66.1 33.2
There are two conclusions one can draw from Table 7 about the belief component in the premium:
(i) The  component in the risk premium is large: for the assets at hand it is generally|J (X,h)|
larger than 50% of the mean premium. We remark that both the premium as well as  areJ (X,h)t
very volatile hence the range of the   component of the risk premium is wide.J (X,h)t
(ii) The  component is largest for short holding returns and declines to about 50% at|J (X,h)|
h=12.  For very short holding periods of less than 3 months this component may often
dominate the premium. 
The second result is consistent with the intuition that risk premia are dominated by market beliefs for
very short holding periods. This result is also compatible with the results reported in Table 3 that
show the  without the belief variables are very small for very short holding periods. R 2
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We stress that may be negative or positive and in the long run may not contribute muchJ (X,h)t
to the mean premium itself. We also recall that the average risk premium contains the constant
component in (23a) which constitutes an important effect of the market beliefs on the volatility of
asset return and hence on the risk premium. We do not measure this effect here.
4. Final Comments: On Bull and Bear Markets
Excess volatility of asset returns above the level accounted by “fundamental” forces is a fact
contested by only very few economists. Asset price volatility does not imply time variability of risk
premia but the converse does hold true. It follows that the exhibited strong impact of market belief
on risk premia teaches us two additional lessons. First, it offers a direct demonstration that market
perception should be considered to be as fundamental to asset pricing as the customary exogenous
variables. Second, that market belief is actually an observable state variable which can be used for a
deeper understanding of the causes of market dynamics. The terms “bull” or “bear” markets have a
limited meaning in an REE based asset pricing theory according to which such markets are related to
business cycles. Contrast this with the fact that during the last half century business cycles have
moderated while volatility of financial markets has not declined and perhaps has increased.
Accordingly, we have shown that beyond the standard effect of business cycles “bull” and “bear”
markets do have specific meaning. “Bull” markets are periods of low risk premium caused by
unusually positive market perception about future asset payoff  while “bear” markets are periods of
high risk premium caused by unusually negative market perception about future asset payoff.
Turning to the nature of the effect of market belief we have shown that the premium on
holding a risky asset over the riskless rate has two components. The first is a direct effect which
results from the impact of market belief on increased excess volatility of asset returns. This premium
is constant. The second effect, which we call “the market belief risk premium,” varies over time. We
have shown that the premium  is decreasing in the mean market belief  . This means that anZt
optimistic market is a market in which risk perception is low and the risk premium is low. Equipped
with a detailed panel data on individual forecasts of interest rates our theory proposes a specific way
in which we should deduce the appropriate panel data of market belief. Using such data we then test
our theory empirically in the markets for Federal Funds Futures, 3 month Treasury Bills and 6 month
Treasury Bills. We show that the data supports the theory and the estimated effect is large.
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APPENDIX A: Derivation of the Value Function
For simplicity we ignore in this Appendix the index i identifying the agent who carries out the optimization.
Hence, the dynamic programming problem is as follows. Given initial values ,  maximize(θ0 , W0 )
 Ut ' Et
(θ , C)
[
j
4
s ' 0
&β
t%s&1e
&( 1
τ
Ct%s)
| Ht]
subject to the following definitions
Wt%1 ' (Wt & Ct )R % θt Qt%1
 Qt%1 ' pt%1 % (dt%1 % µ) & ptR
 ψt ' (1 , dt , zt , gt )
and stochastic transition functions
dt%1 ' λddt % λ
d
ggt % g
d
t%1
,    ,   .Zt%1 ' λzZt % λ
z
ggt % g
z
t%1 Λ
ψ
'
1 , 0 , 0 , 0
0 ,λd , 0 , λ
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g
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gˆt' (1 ,g
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t ,g
z
t ,g
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t , g
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t , g
g
t ) - N(0 , Σ)
gt%1 ' λzgt % g
g
t%1
Step 1: simplification. We thus define, for the unknown matrix V 
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  ,     Λ '
λd , 0 , λ
d
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0 , 0 , λz
V '
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vˆ0 , V11
We now have    ,        where    is a 4×4 matrix
ψt%1 ' Λψψt % Λggˆt%1 Λg '
0 , 0
0 , I(3×3)
We assume that  and verify it later when we solve for equilibrium. Using this price mappt ' addt % azzt % P0
we can compute excess return in terms of the state variables we have that 
Qt%1' (ad % 1)[λd dt%λ
d
ggt%g
d
t%1]%az [λzZt%λ
z
ggt%g
z
t%1]%P0 & [addt%az Zt%P0]R % µ
Hence
Qt%1' [(ad % 1)λd&Rad]dt % [azλz&Raz]Zt% [(ad%1)λ
d
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g]gt%[P0 (1&R)%µ]% [(ad%1)g
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Or,   
Qt%1 ' a
T
ψt % bˆ
T
gt%1 , hence Et[Qt%1] ' a
T
ψt
where
 .a T' ([P0(1&R)%µ] , [(ad % 1)λd&Rad] , [azλz&Raz] , [(ad%1)λ
d
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z
g]) , bˆ
T
'(0, (ad%1), az, 0)
Also, we shall use the notation    .  Now compute the expressionb T' ((ad%1) ,az ,0)
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Algebra and simplification leads to the conclusion that we have 
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Step 2: The Bellman Equation. It is well known (see, for example, the Appendix of Wang (1994)) that the Bellman
Equation for this problem with  is written in the form
γ '
1
τ
     for some parameter matrix VJt ' Max
(θt , Ct )
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Hence, we have an expression for the expectations
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The first order conditions are then stated as follows. Equating the derivative with respect to  θ  to zero leads to 
& α[a T&b TΩΛ0]ψt % α
2
θtb
T
Ωb ' 0
And this proves equation (11) in the text which we can write in the more explicit form (since )Et[Qt%1] ' a
T
ψt
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This last equation determines the parameter vector u. It also shows that this vector is the same for all agents since the
assumption made in the text is that all agents are identically the same except for their belief states .  The lastgt
equation shows that the vector u depends only upon parameters of the stochastic structure.   
Step 3: The Adjusted Variance and Constants. We can also explain the “adjustment” to the variance in (11) since 
 ˆσ2Q ' b
T
Ωb
which is the variance of the excess return function where the covariance matrix used is not G but rather Ω. 
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Now take the derivative with respect to C and equate to zero to obtain
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The final details of showing that the value function is indeed the solution of the Bellman Equation leads to the
demonstration that the unknown parameter α and matrix V are determined by the conditions 
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